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ABSTRACT
Technology has increasingly been implemented in healthcare with the intention of
reducing errors. One area where errors could be reduced is in the pharmaceutical
environment, specifically dispensing errors. A qualitative observational study was
conducted in a pharmaceutical environment to identify system vulnerabilities (SVs) and
workarounds in the work system. This was done to assess how the implementation of a
workflow management system (WFMS) impacts the work system and work practices and
to identify opportunities for error reduction. The work system experienced changes in
work practices and in the SVs following the implementation of the WFMS. Additionally,
the WFMS prompted additional workarounds to occur following implementation. Certain
risks were reduced by the WFMS, as shown by the elimination of certain SVs or
reduction in the risk rating of other SVs. However, certain risks continued to exist and
new risks were introduced as shown by the kinds of workarounds existing after
implementation and the creation of new SVs.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Healthcare errors are costly both in terms of lives lost and monetary cost. The
landmark 2000 report To Err is Human, is often cited to illustrate the high cost of
medical errors. More recently, a study utilizing claims data estimated the annual cost of
medical errors to be $19.5 billion in 2008 dollars (Shreve et al., 2010). Utilizing
Medicare data from 2008, another study estimated that 180,000 Medicare beneficiaries
alone experienced a medical error which contributed in some way to their death
(Levinson & General, 2010). Medical errors often result in a patient experiencing an
adverse outcome, often manifested as prolonged hospitalization, disability at the time of
discharge, or death as a result of improper medical care as opposed to the natural
progression of disease (Andel, Davidow, Hollander, & Moreno, 2012; Kohn, Corrigan, &
Donaldson, 2000; Levinson & General, 2010).
Medication errors represent the largest subset of medical errors (accounting for
about 19% of medical errors) (Leape et al., 1991). A medication error is an error that
occurs anywhere along the medication process from the nurse or doctor ordering the
medication to dispensing the medication to administering and monitoring the medication
(Gandhi et al., 2005). One study found that 28% of medication errors were preventable.
Of the preventable medication errors, 42% were life-threatening or serious medication
errors (Bates et al., 1995). Another study found that the majority of medication errors
involved medications that were administered via intravenous routes (Ross, Wallace, &
Paton, 2000). These types of errors are most often either severe or moderate errors (Taxis
& Barber, 2003).
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Dispensing errors are a subset of medication errors that occur during the
preparation of the dose order. The literature has defined dispensing errors to include
medications that are different from the medication ordered such as the wrong drug or
wrong strength (Guernsey et al., 1983; Rolland, 2004) as well as deviations from standard
pharmacy policy (Cina et al., 2006), mislabeling, missed doses, and doses filled at
incorrect times (Rolland, 2004). One study examining errors in concentration of
intravenous drugs found that a third of doses contained incorrect concentrations of the
medication (Parshuram et al., 2008). Concentration errors are prone to occur for pediatric
patients as their dose preparation typically involves more calculations and dilution of
stocks than for adult patients (Kaushal et al., 2001). Dose errors in pediatric medications
errors are especially problematic as pediatric patients are more vulnerable and have the
potential for higher harm should there be a dosing error (Kaushal et al., 2001). Compared
with the other stages of the process (e.g., ordering, administering, monitoring) the least
number of medication errors occur in the dispensing process (Bates et al., 1995; Nebeker,
Hoffman, Weir, Bennett, & Hurdle, 2005). However, studies have found that unprevented
dispensing errors occur in between 0.06 to 18% (James et al., 2009) of doses which
indicatdes that there is an opportunity to reduce errors within the dispensing process.
Implementing technology is one way to address safety and other concerns in a
variety of domains including healthcare, manufacturing and transportation.
Unfortunately, the implementation of technology can sometimes have unexpected
adverse effects which negatively impact safety (Ash, Berg, & Coiera, 2004; Eslami, AbuHanna, de Keizer, & de Jonge, 2006; Karsh, Weinger, Abbott, & Wears, 2010; Koppel et
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al., 2005; Nebeker et al., 2005; Shen & Neyens, 2014). Consequently, it is important that
the technology be evaluated and understood both before and after implementation.
Various technologies, including computer provider order entry (CPOE) systems (Bates et
al., 1998; Eslami et al., 2006; Koppel et al., 2005), bar coding medication administration
(BCMA) (So, 2012), and electronic health or medical record (EHR or EMR) systems
(Nebeker et al., 2005) have been evaluated as ways to reduce medication errors (Ash et
al., 2004; Gandhi et al., 2005; Karsh et al., 2010). However, the majority of the research
has focused on the prescription process (e.g., orders for medication administration)
(Grossman, Cross, Boukus, & Cohen, 2012; Koppel et al., 2005; Magrabi, Li, Day, &
Coiera, 2010) or the drug administration process rather than the dispensing process
(Rothschild et al., 2005). Consequently, there is the opportunity for more investigation on
to improve safety in the dispensing process.
A workflow management system (WFMS) is a type of technology that can be
utilized in the dispensing process to potentially reduce errors and improve patient safety.
In general, a WFMS should support the work processes performed by an organization.
WFMS have been implemented in a variety of domains, including healthcare (Halsted &
Froehle, 2008). Because WFMS are designed to interact with the current work system, it
is important to understand the actions and activities that comprise the actual work system
and processes. There is often a discrepancy between the way actions are intended to be
completed and the way actions are actually completed – such that, the intended work
system differs slightly from the actual work system. An example of this is a workaround,
which occurs when a user executes an action different than the system intended as a
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result of something blocking the intended path to execution (Koopman & Hoffman,
2003). The term block will be used in this study to describe the process, event, or system
characteristics that blocks the intended path. However, other terminology has been used
to describe the same blocking mechanism including gaps (Cook, Render, & Woods,
2000), problems (Holden, Rivera-Rodriguez, Faye, Scanlon, & Karsh, 2013), challenges
(McAlearney et al., 2007), operational failures (Tucker & Spear, 2006), and barriers
(Holden, 2011). The blocking mechanism can range from a system failure, such as not
recognizing a necessary input, to an intentional avoidance of a system due to perceptions
that the system is not trustworthy or difficult to use. Another example of a possible block
includes situations where the system or technology does not match the work practices in
such a way that there is a benefit for the user to interact with the technology or system
(Vogelsmeier, Halbesleben, & Scott-Cawiezell, 2008). The workarounds occur in
reaction to the blocks. Sometimes the workaround can bridge gaps that exist in the work
systems and prevent errors by anticipating and reacting to these gaps (Cook et al., 2000).
Other times workarounds can lead to negative consequences including potential errors.
Workarounds may themselves foster system vulnerabilities. Likewise, system
vulnerabilities, such as those resulting from a poorly designed system, may encourage
workarounds. For this study, a system vulnerability (SV) is defined as an undesirable
situation or outcome that is created by the interaction of a user, technology, system, or
process factor, that can lead to a patient safety event or the potential for a patient safety
event (e.g., a precursor). This definition draws on the SV definition used by Yang et al.
(2014) of “activities or events that have the potential to risk a patient’s safety, increase
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cost and waste, or reduce efficiency of the workflow.” SVs and workarounds can be
precursors or manifestations of unintended negative consequences such as decrements in
patient safety. Identifying SVs in a work system pre- and post- technology
implementation can be a powerful way to examine the success of a system in terms of the
incorporation of the technology into the work system or the adaptation of the work
system to the technology. Evaluating SVs can function as a robust tool to investigate
workarounds and other aspects which impact how a technology is best implemented in a
system.
A user’s trust in the technology can play an important role in how a user interacts
with a technology or system (Lee & See, 2004) and consequently influences the existence
of both SVs and workarounds. When a user’s trust in a technology and its capabilities are
mismatched with the technology’s actual capabilities, misuse or disuse occurs (Lee &
See, 2004). Misuse occurs when a user’s expectations of the technology’s capabilities are
higher than reality and the user over relies on the technology. A consequence of
technology misuse includes complacency. For example, users may rely on the technology
to notify them of any issue rather than simultaneously monitoring other sources of
information (Parasuraman & Wickens, 2008). Disuse is the opposite of misuse, and
results when a user underutilizes the technology as a result of underestimating the
technology’s capabilities (Lee & See, 2004). When a user disuses a technology, a
workaround may result in which the user bypasses the technology in favor of performing
an action without the assistance of the technology. When this occurs some of the positive
benefits of the system, such as error catching, may be eradicated. SVs may impact the
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level of trust a user has in a technology. For example, if a technology is producing
excessive and incorrect alerts or alarms the user may disuse the technology and ignore an
alert (Parasuraman & Wickens, 2008).
When looking at a work system, artifacts may be examined to learn more about
the work practices and how the work system is designed and implemented. An artifact is
something that is used or created “in the course of doing work” (Beyer & Holtzblatt,
1998). If a waiter writes down the customer’s order on a notepad and then enters the
order into a computer that relays the order to the kitchen, he creates the physical artifact:
the piece of paper with the order. This is then transformed into a digital artifact: the
electronic computer order. Artifacts contain information (Beyer & Holtzblatt, 1998).
Through the user’s interaction with the artifact, the artifact gains information about the
user and how the user works. For example, how the order is written on the notepad can
give insight into the waiter and his or her work practices. The artifact also may contain
information that the user may utilize. For example, a computer may prompt the waiter to
select a cook temperature for steak which transfers the information that steaks can be
cooked at different temperatures.
In order to properly and successfully implement a technology into a work system
it is important to have a comprehensive understanding of the work practices and how the
users actually operate within the work system. A system can be qualitatively investigated
by examining the workarounds and SVs in order to develop a more robust understanding
of the system. Therefore, the goal of this research is to determine the impact of the
implementation of a WFMS had on work practices and a work system. This will be done
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by identifying SVs in both the pre- and post-implementation work systems and
identifying workarounds that users have done as a result of the implementation of the
work system.
This section presented the foundation and literature related to the research
conducted in this thesis. This review sets the stage for understanding how the complexity
in work domains impacts the technology design and implementation. In the following
chapter, the methodology used to conduct an observational study examining the impact of
a WFMS on a pharmaceutical work system will be detailed.
Research Objective
The objective of this study is to evaluate the impact of a WFMS on work practices
and a work system by identifying and rating pre- and post-implementation SVs,
identifying workarounds that users engage in as a result of the implementation of the
work system, and qualitatively examining how these SVs and workarounds could impact
patient safety.
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CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGY
The previous chapter provided the background necessary for understanding this
research by discussing the importance of improving safety through reducing errors in
healthcare settings and the role technology plays. This chapter will outline the
methodology used to evaluate the technology’s impact on a pharmaceutical work system
through the identification and examinations of SVs and workarounds. First an overview
of the work system and environment will be given followed by a description of the
methodology used to complete an analysis – work model creation, system vulnerability
identification and analysis, and block/workaround identification and analysis.
Observations
In total, 50 hours of observations were completed at several inpatient pharmacies
associated with hospitals within a 700 bed academic medical center in the Southeastern
United States. The study was approved by both the Institutional Review Boards at the
Medical University of South Carolina and Clemson University (IRB# Pro00039896).
Observations were conducted post-WFMS implementation during both day and night
shifts. Observations involved shadowing pharmacy employees including pharmacists,
pharmacy technicians, and students/trainees as they completed tasks associated with IV
medication preparation. This included compounding the IV medication doses in the clean
room, preparing the IV medication doses that could be filled with pre-made IV bags (and
consequently completed outside the clean room), verifying that these doses were prepared
correctly, and sorting the doses to be delivered to the specific unit or floor for
administration to the patients. Compounding was primarily performed by the pharmacy
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technicians, whereas dose verification was exclusively performed by pharmacists. Both
pharmacy technicians and pharmacists completed the sorting process.
In addition to shadowing the employees, employees were also asked clarifying
and probing questions through informal conversation between tasks. Probing questions
were used to determine the work practices pre-WFMS implementation, to determine the
intended pre- and post-WFMS implementation work practices and for clarification related
to any non-standard work process observed. This was done informally to ensure that the
participants feel at ease and comfortable discussing their true work practices. (Barriball &
While, 1994)
Observations and conversation were noted on paper and the notes were
transcribed immediately following each observation session. Each observation session
was limited to two-hour periods to minimize the impact on work productivity, to ensure
the observer notes were complete, and to facilitate clarifications with the staff if needed.
During the transcriptions, additional clarifying and explanatory notes were added. These
were clearly marked as post-observation notes. Once the intended work process (as
intended by the technology, policies and procedures in use) was determined, observed
system vulnerabilities and workarounds were noted. Actions and situations that
constituted a workaround or system vulnerability were determined based on knowledge
of the intended process, comments by workers and, when applicable, discussions with
domain experts.
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Pharmacies
Three 24 hour inpatient pharmacies were observed. Each pharmacy serviced a
separate hospital: a children’s hospital, a general hospital that handles a variety of
patients and a hospital that specializes in digestive health and heart and vascular care.
The pharmacies were similar in the number of IV prescriptions prepared daily but were
different in terms of the workplace culture, layout, work policies and practices, and
employee experience with both job tasks and with the pharmacy technology.
Additionally, there were some differences observed between the pharmacies in terms of
the specific doses and concentrations created due to the differences in the patient
population (especially comparing the children’s hospital with the adult hospitals).
Observing multiple pharmacies was crucial to developing a holistic understanding of the
dose preparation process both with and without the assistance of the specific pharmacy
technology. This assisted in developing a comprehensive understanding of the work
system changes in the context of system vulnerabilities and workarounds present in the
dose preparation process both with and without the existence of the WFMS.

Workflow Management System
The technology that was implemented in the pharmacies is a WFMS with built in
safety features to prevent potential medication preparation errors. Orders for the doses are
received and assigned to the appropriate workstation (e.g., clean room, pre-made dose
station, verification station, sorting station) as they move through the preparation process.
Users at each workstation were able to digitally organize the doses and easily monitor
their workload. The technology featured a graphical user interface (GUI) which walked
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pharmacy technicians through the steps for preparing each dose. As the pharmacy
technician was preparing the dose, the technology required them to take pictures of their
preparation process at each step. These images were then used by the pharmacist to verify
that the dose had been properly prepared. Prior to the technology’s implementation, all
items used to complete the dose (e.g., syringes, medication vials) were placed in a basket
and the pharmacist used these physical artifacts to verify that the dose had been properly
prepared. The technology relied heavily on barcode scanning for tracking and error
prevention. Patient-dose barcode-based labels were printed when a dose preparation
process was initiated and were scanned in conjunction with the manufacturers’ barcodes
on the dose ingredients. When the preparation process was completed the same patientdose barcode was scanned to move the dose to the queue for verification. To verify that
the dose had been properly prepared, the pharmacist viewed the digital images that had
been taken during the dose preparation process. Once the dose was digitally verified by
the pharmacist, the sorting process could begin. The sorting process involved scanning
the patient-dose barcode which triggered the system to automatically print a new label
with two barcodes. One barcode facilitated tracking the dose’s location from within the
WFMS. The other barcode was for documenting medication administration in a different
software that was used throughout the entire hospitals by nurses, doctors and other
medical staff.
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Work System Analysis
The work system was analyzed through the creation of work models, the coding
of the observation transcriptions, and user ratings. Work models, such as information
flow diagrams, were created to visualize and more fully comprehend the work system. To
better understand the work system and dissect the work system into meaningful parts, the
observation transcriptions were coded separately for system vulnerabilities (SVs) and
workarounds. The Coding Analysis Toolkit (CAT), a web-based, open source coding
software, was used for coding both the system vulnerabilities (SVs) and the workarounds.
Finally, users of the system participated in a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA),
a method commonly used in a variety of fields to quantitatively analyze failure within a
system, to rate the identified SVs.

Work Model Creation
Work models were created to illustrate the information flow and the step by step
work process for both the pre- and post-WFMS implementation work systems. The
information flow work models provided a visualization of how the information moves
between entities in the work system and how this movement changed following the
implementation of the WFMS. Work process model gave the step by step process for
both the dose preparation and dose verification process. How each step was completed in
the pre- and post-WFMS implementation work system was laid out side by side for an
easy comparison. Additionally, having this side by side comparison allowed for an easy
visualization of how certain steps were added or changed following the implementation
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of the WFMS. Following the identification of the SVs, stars representing SVs were laid
on the work process model to illustrate where each SV could occur in the process. The
completed work process model was confirmed to accurately represent the dose
preparation process by a subject matter expert familiar with working in the process.

System Vulnerability (SV) Coding
The Coding Analysis Toolkit (CAT) software was utilized to code specific text
snippets from the observations transcripts that pertained to SVs observed or described in
the conversations, as well as precursors to SVs identified during observation. The 300
identified text snippets were then condensed using common characteristics. This was
done by assigning each text snipped one or more common characteristic, such as
“interruptions” or “quantity mismatch.” The text snippets were then examined in groups
determined by their assigned common characteristics. Text snippets discussing the same
SV were reduced and a meaningful list of 21 SVs was created. It was determined whether
the SV could occur in the pre-WFMS implementation work system, the post-WFMS
implementation work system, or both. A brief description of how each SV manifests
itself in the work system was created. The step(s) of the process during which the SV
could occur was determined. Stars representing each SV were placed in the appropriate
locations of the work process model which had been previously created.
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Failure Modes and Effects Analysis of System Vulnerabilities
A failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) was done to assess the risks
presented by each SV and determine what effect the implementation of the WFMS had
on the risk. A FMEA is a tool for preemptively assessing the risk that exists in a system
(Childers & Neyens, 2014). A typical FMEA involves stakeholders rating potential
failure modes in three standard areas – probability of occurrence (i.e., likelihood),
severity of effect (i.e., impact on safety), and ease of detection (Childers & Neyens,
2014). For this FMEA the stakeholders were determined to be the pharmacists and
pharmacy technicians who used the WFMS and SVs were used as potential failure
modes.
Users across all shifts from all three pharmacies were asked to individually rate
each SV both pre- and post-WFMS implementation on a 5 point Likert scale in the three
standard areas – likelihood (extremely unlikely (1) – extremely likely (5)), impact on
safety (not at all (1) to always (5)), and ease of detection (very difficult (1) to very easy
(5)). A 5 point Likert scale was used as it is commonly used in health care settings
(Childers & Neyens, 2014). SVs that were determined to only exist in the pre- or postWFMS implementation work system were only rated in the work system in which they
existed. Participants only rated SVs pre-WFMS implementation if they had experience
working in that work system. Ratings were collected from a total of 33 participants over
the course of one day. The ease of detection ratings were reversed so that a lower rating
indicated less of a risk (i.e., very easy (1) to very difficult (5)). Following the reversal of
the ease of detection ratings, mean ratings were determined for each category for each
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pre- and post-WFMS implementation SV. For each SV in each work system, the mean
ratings were then multiplied to determine a risk priority number (RPN) which represents
the overall perceived risk the SV poses to the system. Because a 5 point Likert scale was
used the RPN had the potential of ranging from 1 (minimum risk) to 125 (maximum
risk). The higher the RPN was the more risk that SV presented to the system. Likewise, a
lower RPN represents less risk to a system.

Workaround Coding
The observation transcript coding for workarounds was done by utilizing CAT to
code text snippets from the observations transcripts and then condensing these text
snippets utilizing common characteristics. These text snippets included those that
discussed both workarounds and the blocks that created or encouraged workarounds. The
categorization of the condensed list of workarounds and blocks was different from the
categorization of the SVs. However, it is important to note that some SVs functioned as
blocks. In order to properly categorizing workarounds and blocks, a model was
developed (see Figure 1). This model provided a visualization of the interaction of three
aspects – policy and procedure, technology, and work practices – that could motivate the
existence of a block and be involved in the resulting workaround. Workarounds and
blocks were to one of the 7 sections of Figure 1 depending on what combination of the
three aspects played into the block’s existence or were incorporated in the resultant
workaround.
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Figure 1. Block and workaround categorization with sections identified numerically

The three circles within the Venn diagram represented the three aspects that could
motivate the existence of a block and be involved in the resulting workaround - policies
and procedures, technology, and work practices. Policy and procedures represented the
rules and how the work was intended to be done – the intended work practice or the
standard work practices. Technology was primarily the WFMS although it could also
include the label printer in the pre-WFMS implementation work system and any other
technology encountered. Work practices were how the tasks were actually completed
which may differ by user and may not match the intended work process. Each block or
workaround was assigned to one of the seven sections contained in the three overlapping
circles. For blocks, the assignment was based on which aspect(s) (i.e., policy and
procedure, technology, and/or work practices) the caused the block to exist. For example,
if the limitations of technology forced the user to go outside the standard work practice
but policy and procedure and actual work practices did not interfere with the path to
completing the action then that block was assigned to section 7. For workarounds, the
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assignment was based on which aspect(s) were included in the workaround. For example,
if the workaround incorporated technology and actual work practices but did not follow
the policy and procedures then it would be assigned to the section 4.
In this chapter the methodology developed and used in this research was
discussed. The following chapter will give the results found utilizing this methodology to
evaluate the impact the implementation of a WFMS had on a pharmaceutical work
system.
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CHAPTER 3. RESULTS
The previous chapter discussed the methodology developed and used to find the
results that will be discussed in this chapter. In this chapter the results will be broken
down into three sections – general findings, results relating to SVs, and results relating to
workarounds.
Overview
The implementation of the WFMS fundamentally changed aspects of the work
system. While the fundamental goal of creating i.v. compounding medications safely and
efficiently remained the same, both the intended work process for achieving this goal and
the actual work process different users took changed. As can be seen in Figure 2, more
steps are required to prepare a dose in the post-WFMS implementation work system.
However, verification can begin earlier in the post-WFMS implementation work system.
Also, the way each step is completed for the preparation and verification process varies
between the pre- and post-WFMS implementation work systems, as seen in Figures 2 and
3. A list of the SVs noted in Figures 2 and 3 can be found in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
With the implementation of the WFMS several artifacts that were previously
physical became electronic. For example, pre-implementation the dose order was
represented and signaled by the physical artifact of a label. Post-implementation the dose
order was represented and signaled electronically in the WFMS. Another example is the
artifacts used to verify that the dose has been properly prepared. Pre-implementation the
physical artifacts used to create the dose are used by the pharmacist. However, post-
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implementation it is not the physical artifacts that the pharmacist uses but rather pictures
of the tools used to create the dose order – the electronic representations of these artifacts.
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Table 1. System vulnerability descriptions and manifestations in pre-implementation
work system
Pre-Dose Edge

Inventory
Issues

Work
Process
Flow

Error made in dose preparation

Waiting on
verification

Verified as correct but
error in preparation

Timing of
Preparation

Key

Technology
Issues

Have to wait on reconstitution to
dissolve to prepare other dose
Dose prepared early
Dose prepared late

1

Delay in dose preparation possible if reconstitution not prepared in
advance due to it being unclear which ones are needed.

2

Dose expires before administered or order is cancelled after dose is
prepared

3

Dose label could be stored improperly/misplaced and prepared later
than intended

Previously verified reconstitution
actually has error in preparation process

4

Ingredient used but not documented as
used (for verification)

5

Pharmacy technician forgets to put vial in basket after using
ingredient

Dose is prepared differently than is
conveyed to the pharmacist

6

Different quantity of drug is used than is
documented (for verification)

7

Syringe pulled back to incorrect location, ingredient not put in
basket and used (or vice-versa)
Pharmacy technician could pull syringe back to different quantity
than used, or if two or more ingredients were used it could be
unclear which syringe corresponds with which ingredient

Delay in when pharmacist can begin
verification

8

Verification requires physical dose so pharmacist must wait until
pharmacy technician places basket in pass through window

9

If multiple dose baskets and small pass-through window could run
out of space or cause baskets to be misplaced

Crowded pass through window
Verification is a bottleneck
Pharmacy technician does not know
how to properly complete preparation
process
Incorrect ingredient used

10

If already verified there is no way to re-examine preparation process

Doses pile up waiting to be verified during busy times

11

Pharmacy Technician relies primarily on knowledge in the head to
prepare dose

12

Ingredients are verified as correct by pharmacist during verification.
If incorrect ingredient used, it results in waste.

13

Pharmacy Technician could forget to or intentionally not update
label

14

Label could be lost or misplaced and pharmacy would only be
notified after dose is not on the floor when needed

Calculation error in amount of
ingredient to use

15

Calculations are done by pharmacy technicians but verified by
pharmacist after the preparation of dose is complete

Ingredient used expires before dose is to
be administered

16

Pharmacist visually verifies expiration date but it may not be salient
if expiration date is before dose due date

Pharmacy Technician or Pharmacist
may be interrupted

17

Worker may duplicate action or forget where in the process they are
when interrupted

18

If ingredient is in a multi-use vial, then pharmacy technician must
either wait for verification to be complete or open a new vial

19

Pharmacy technician who previously used multi-use vial may not
record or incorrectly record quantity remaining in vial

Unable to locate dose once delivered to
floor

20

No proof that dose had been delivered or record of where dose is in
system

Excessive and inconsistent warning

21

Label is not used or is filled out with
incorrect or missing information
Dose order lost

Pharmacy Technician must wait for
necessary ingredient to be returned by
verifying pharmacist
How much ingredient is left in vial is
unknown
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Table 2. System vulnerability descriptions and manifestations in post-implement work
system
Post-WFMS

Key
Timing of
Preparation

Have to wait on reconstitution to
dissolve to prepare other dose
Dose prepared early

2

Inventory
Issues

Work
Process
Flow

Error made in dose preparation

Waiting on
verification

Verified as correct but
error in preparation

Dose prepared late

Technology
Issues

1

Organization of the WFMS queue increases salience of upcoming dose
orders but pharmacy technician must still be aware of which dose orders
require slow dissolving reconstitutions.
The WFMS waits until close to due date to put dose orders with short
expiration periods in the queue. However, some doses still could be
cancelled after preparation if prepared too early

3

Organization of the WFMS queue minimizes late preparation of dose but
excessive orders in queue could obscure dose order.

Previously verified reconstitution
actually has error in preparation process

4

Pharmacist can examine images that were used to initially verify but images
may be not represent all aspects of the preparation process

Ingredient used but not documented as
used (for verification)

5

The WFMS requires ingredient to be scanned but pharmacy technician could
forget to capture image of all ingredients used.
Photograph misrepresents dose preparation (e.g., not all syringes/vials
included in picture). Ingredients not all scanned.
The WFMS requires picture of syringe with ingredient in it. However, the
WFMS could be used differently than intended (e.g., take picture of empty,
pulled back syringe)

Dose is prepared differently than is
conveyed to the pharmacist
Different quantity of drug is used than is
documented (for verification)
Delay in when pharmacist can begin
verification
Crowded pass through window
Verification is a bottleneck
Pharmacy technician does not know how
to properly complete preparation process
Incorrect ingredient used
Label is not used or is filled out with
incorrect or missing information
Dose order lost

6
7
8
9

Pass-through window could still be crowded with doses but not needing to
pass artifacts means there is more space

10
11

Low level of detail of instruction or instructions in different order than how
completed in real world could cause confusion to novice users

12
13
14

Calculation error in amount of ingredient
to use

15

Ingredient used expires before dose is to
be administered

16

Pharmacist visually verifies expiration date and the WFMS does not allow
ingredient made in house to be used if it expires soon

Pharmacy Technician or Pharmacist may
be interrupted

17

The WFMS reminds worker what has been completed but some information
may need to be recalled. Process is still vulnerable to interruptions.

Pharmacy Technician must wait for
necessary ingredient to be returned by
verifying pharmacist
How much ingredient is left in vial is
unknown

18
19

Unable to locate dose once delivered to
floor

20

Excessive and inconsistent warning

21

When more than one multi-use vial used in preparing a dose then which vial
is considered only partially used by the system is unclear

Predictable warnings (i.e., asking to reprint time med labels) mean that other
important warnings could be ignored. Inconsistent warnings (i.e., do not
shake not always on unshakeable labels) make warnings lose reliability
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IV Dose Preparation
17

Pre-WFMS
1. Initial
verification

21

Order verified by the pharmacist

Post-WFMS
Order verified by the pharmacist

Batch of labels print on regular interval

Order received by WFMS

Urgent labels print immediately

Order routed to destination pharmacy workstation

2. Dose orders received
14
Batch of dose orders received on regular interval
3. Dose orders
organized

Labels organized by pharmacy technician
Urgent dose orders received immediately

2, 3

Order to fill selected by Pharmacy technician
4. Preparation process
initiated in WFMS
5. Ingredients collected

Label prints and WFMS shows ingredients needed on screen
12,
18

Pharmacy technician retrieves necessary ingredients and
supplies

Pharmacy technician retrieves necessary ingredients
and supplies

16

6. Ingredients entered

Pharmacy technician scans ingredients into WFMS via ingredient barcode
Ingredients NOT in final state

7. Instructions
Displayed

8. Ingredients prepared

9. Ingredients recorded

10. Ingredients
measured

11. Quantity of
ingredients recorded

Pharmacy technician
prepares ingredients that
require additional
preparation

Ingredients in
final state
Ingredients and
supplies placed in
basket

Pharmacy technician prepares
ingredients that require
additional preparation

Ingredients NOT
in final state

1,

11
Empty syringe is pulled back to quantity
which full syringe contained

Label is placed on completed dose

14. Completed dose
recorded

Completed and labelled dose is placed in
basket with empty syringes and used vials

7

15

Pharmacy technician injects drug into diluent bag
Label is placed on completed dose

13

Image captured of complete labelled dose, all
ingredients and tools used to create the dose

Verification can
begin

Dose label scanned to signify preparation is complete
and ready for verification

15. Dose signaled as
complete
16. Dose prepared to
leave clean room
17. Dose leaves clean
room

Following WFMS instructions pharmacy technician removes drug
from vial with syringe

An image of the full syringe and used vial is captured

Empty and pulled back syringe, and
drug vial are placed in basket

13. Dose labelled

Ingredients in
final state

Image(s) are captured of ingredient label showing
expiration date and lot number

5

Tech removes drug from vial with syringe

Pharmacy technician injects drug into diluent bag

WFMS provides preparation
instructions for any ingredients
requiring additional preparation

4,
19

Drug and diluent placed in basket for
preparation with label

12. Ingredients added
to diluent

Once all correct ingredients are
scanned, WFMS displays
instructions on dose preparation.

Completed and labelled dose is placed in basket
8
Basket placed in pass through
window for verification

Verification can
begin

Basket placed in pass through window
9

Legend
Task

Action completed for all dose orders

Leads to next action

Task only existing post-WFMS

Action completed for only certain dose orders

Leads to possible next action

Figure 2. Dose Preparation pre- and post-implementation
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#

System Vulnerability

Pharmacist Verification
10

1. Dose
Received

2. Dose
selected

3. Dose
preparation
reviewed
4. Dose
accepted/
reworked/
rejected

Dose order received and appears in
pharmacist verification queue
(Step 14 in preparation process)

Pharmacist retrieves basket from pass through window

Pharmacist selects dose to verify

Pharmacist reviews items contained in basket (pulled back syringes and used
vials) to ensure dose properly prepared

Pharmacist accepts dose
and initials label

5. Dose issue
communicated

6. Dose routed

Post-WFMS

Pre-WFMS
Dose placed in pass through window by pharmacy technician
(Step 17 in Preparation process)

Dose placed in
proper unit bin to be
delivered

Pharmacist requests
rework for dose

Pharmacist rejects dose

Pharmacist verbally
communicates issue with
dose preparation to
pharmacy technician

Pharmacist verbally
communicates issue with
dose preparation to
pharmacy technician

Dose and basket
placed in pass
through window.

Dose discarded.

Pharmacy Technician corrects issue
with drug and passes dose and basket
back to pharmacist.

7. Corrections
made

New label printed and
preparation process
begins again.

6

Pharmacist reviews images taken during dose
preparation to ensure dose properly prepared

Pharmacist accepts
dose

Pharmacist requests
rework for dose

Pharmacist puts note in
dose order record stating
reason for rework

Dose routed
to sorting
queue

Pharmacist notes in
dose order record
reason for rejection

Dose order routed
to rework queue.
Pharmacy technician

Pharmacy Technician corrects
issue with drug and adds pictures
of correction to dose order record.

Pharmacist
rejects dose

Physical dose
located and
discarded

System creates new dose
order and preparation
process begins again.
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Legend
Task

Action completed for all dose orders

Leads to next action

Task only existing post-WFMS

Action completed for only certain dose orders

Leads to possible next action

#

System Vulnerability

Figure 3. Verification process pre- and post-implementation

Another key difference between the pre- and post-WFMS implementation work
system is the manner in which information is transmitted through the work system. As
seen in Figure 4, much of the information pre-WFMS implementation was transmitted
from and through the dose order label and the information flow through other entities in
the process followed a generally linear pattern. In the post-WFMS implementation work
system the information flow centers around the WFMS which is represented by the
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dotted box on Figure 5 and contains the entities of the dose order information and drug
information. Unlike the pre-WFMS implementation work system, information tends to
follow a loop formation here and flow in both directions between the WFMS and other
entities in the information flow diagram. Part of this transition involved the movement of
artifacts from the physical to the electronic.
With these changes in the work process, artifacts, and information flow, the SVs
in the work system changed as well as the blocks and workarounds following the
implementation of the WFMS.

Pre-Workflow
Management System

Dose
Preparation
Artifacts

Package
Insert

Order

Dose Order
Label prints

Pharmacy
Technician

Prepare Dose

Pharmacist

Dose Order
Label

Legend
External Entitites

Data Store

Processes

Figure 4. Pre-implementation information flow
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Pharmacist
verifies

Dose
delivered to
floor

Post-Workflow
Management System

Pharmacy
Technician

Order

Pharmacy
Technician/
Pharmacist

Pharmacist

Prepare Dose

Verify Dose
Sort Dose

Dose out for
delivery

Dose Order
Information

Drug
Information

..

Legend
External Entity

Data Store

Processes

Inside the WFMS

Figure 5. Post-implementation information flow

System Vulnerabilities
A number of pre- and post- implementation system vulnerabilities (SVs) were
identified. Certain SVs were eliminated with the implementation of the WFMS and exist
only in the pre-implementation work system. Certain SVs were created by the
implementation of the WFMS and exist only in the post-implementation work system.
Most SVs identified exist in both pre- and post-implementation work systems but were
affected by the implementation of the WFMS. The list of SVs, and how they manifest
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themselves in both the pre- and post-implementation work system, can be found in Table
1.
Some SVs, such as the pharmacy technician or pharmacist being interrupted, can
occur anywhere in the dose preparation process. Other SVs, such as the pharmacy
technician not knowing how to properly complete the dose preparation process, only
impact certain steps of the dose preparation process. Different SVs can only occur during
one particular step in the dose preparation process, such as an ingredient that expires
prior to dose administration being used. The pre- and post-implementation dose
preparation process, along with visualizations of where in the process the SVs can occur,
can be found in Figure 1. Similarly, the dose verification process – where the pharmacist
verifies that the dose has been properly prepared based on the artifacts provided by the
pharmacy technicians – along with representations of applicable SVs can be found in
Figure 2. Again certain SVs, such as the verification process being a bottleneck, apply to
the entire verification process. Other SVs, such as the dose being prepared differently
than is conveyed to the pharmacist by the artifacts, only apply to a single step of the
verification process. One SV, that the dose cannot be located once delivered to the floor,
is only applicable following the dose verification process. In both Figures 2 and 3, SVs
that can occur in both the pre- and post-implementation work system are indicated by
stars spanning both columns. SVs that can occur in only the pre-implementation or postimplementation work systems are indicated by a star in only one column.
As shown in Table 2, all SVs that continued to exist following the implementation
of the WFMS were found to have a lower risk priority number following the
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implementation of the WFMS. In other words, the risk the SV posed to the work system,
either through the likelihood of occurrence, impact on safety, ease of detection or some
combination of these, was lessened. Once the SVs had been identified, users ranked each
of them in three categories used in an FMEA – likelihood of occurrence, impact of safety
and ease of detection. The ratings in each of these categories were multiplied to
determine a risk priority number (RPN) for each pre- and post- implementation SV.
Based on the rating scale, RPNs could potentially range between 1 and 125 with the
higher the RPN the greater risk the SV poses to the system. The highest rated SV, with an
RPN of 43.51, was doses being unable to be located once delivered to the floor. This SV
was eliminated with the implementation of the WFMS and consequently does not have a
post-implementation RPN. The amount the RPN was reduced with the implementation of
the WFMS varied. The percent change, shown in the right most column of Table 3,
shows how the RPN reduction varied between SVs. The SV with the greatest reduction in
RPN (27.8 points) was the dose being prepared differently than conveyed to the
pharmacist. This SV had a percent change of -68.47%. The SV of the pass through
window being crowded experienced the smallest drop in RPN (2.52 points) which was
also illustrated in its lower percent change of 14.47%. All SVs that existed pre- and postimplementation experienced a drop in the PRN (and across all three categories that make
up the RPN) following the implementation of the WFMS and consequently all percent
changes were negative.
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Table 3. FMEA results (higher values indicate higher risk)
Likelihood (L)

Inventory
Issues

Work Process
Flow

Error made in dose preparation

Waiting on
verification

Verified as correct but error in
preparation

Timing of
Preparation

Key

Tech.
Issues

Safety Impact
(S)

Ease of
Detection (D)

Risk Priority Number
(L*S*D)

Pre-

Post-

Pre-

Post-

Pre-

Post-

Pre-

Post-

% change

1

3.75

3.50

3.17

2.5

1.91

1.62

22.74

14.15

-37.77%

2

3.63

3.27

2.54

2.24

2.33

1.73

21.51

12.65

-41.19%

3

3.04

2.72

3.88

3.24

2.25

1.76

26.54

15.49

-41.64%

4

2.83

2.06

4.38

4.09

3.30

1.94

40.96

16.36

-60.06%

5

2.54

1.85

4.21

3.70

3.33

1.91

35.64

13.09

-63.27%

6

2.74

1.88

4.26

3.56

3.48

1.91

40.60

12.80

-68.47%

7

2.74

1.88

4.30

3.94

3.22

2.03

37.91

15.03

-60.35%

8

3.50

-

3.79

-

1.96

-

25.98

-

-

9

3.63

3.53

3.29

3.12

1.46

1.35

17.42

14.90

-14.47%

10

3.63

-

3.57

-

1.83

-

23.66

-

-

11

2.58

2.09

4.04

3.88

1.96

1.62

20.41

13.12

-35.72%

12

2.88

-

4.33

-

2.25

-

28.06

-

-

13

2.46

-

4.25

-

1.96

-

20.47

-

-

14

3.13

-

4.38

-

2.67

-

36.56

-

-

Calculation error in amount of
ingredient to use

15

2.91

-

4.38

-

2.46

-

31.33

-

-

Ingredient used expires before
dose is to be administered

16

3.00

2.24

4.29

3.79

2.79

1.94

35.93

16.46

-54.19%

Pharmacy Technician or
Pharmacist may be interrupted

17

4.04

3.62

4.08

3.97

1.96

1.53

32.28

21.98

-31.91%

18

3.25

-

3.58

-

1.92

-

22.30

-

-

19

3.42

2.59

2.75

2.27

2.29

2.03

21.55

11.93

-44.64%

Unable to locate dose once
delivered to floor

20

4.00

-

4.17

-

2.61

-

43.51

-

-

Excessive and inconsistent
warning

21

-

2.53

-

2.82

-

2.26

-

16.16

-

Have to wait on reconstitution
to dissolve to prepare other
dose
Dose prepared early
Dose prepared late
Previously verified
reconstitution actually has error
in preparation process
Ingredient used but not
documented as used (for
verification)
Dose is prepared differently
than is conveyed to the
pharmacist
Different quantity of drug is
used than is documented (for
verification)
Delay in when pharmacist can
begin verification
Crowded pass through window
Verification is a bottleneck
Pharmacy technician does not
know how to properly complete
preparation process
Incorrect ingredient used
Label is not used or is filled out
with incorrect or missing
information
Dose order lost

Pharmacy Technician must wait
for necessary ingredient to be
returned by verifying
pharmacist
How much ingredient is left in
vial is unknown
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Workarounds
A number of pre- and post-implementation blocks and workarounds were
identified through observation and confirmed with a subject matter expert. An illustration
of how a block and its subsequent workaround works can be found in Figure 6. The
workaround is illustrated by the dashed arrow and the solid arrow that go around the
block. The dashed arrow illustrates a workaround that is outside the norm but still
considered an acceptable work process. This usually occurs when a work system has been
set up to anticipate certain blocks and has a standard procedure for working around them.
The solid arrow is a larger deviation from the standard procedure and may move outside
of what is an acceptable or anticipated work process. The aspects which impacted the
existence of the blocks – policy and procedures, technology and/or work practices – were
identified and blocks were assigned as belonging to a region of Figure 1 which can be
found in the methodology section. Similarly, the aspects that each workaround
incorporated – policy and procedures, technology and/or work practices – were also
identified and workarounds were classified into one of the regions shown in Figure 1.
Most blocks were identified as motivating one or more workarounds.
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Task 2

Block

Task 1

Task 3

Task 4

Within pre-defined work process (Level 1)
Outside pre-defined work processes (Level 2)
Figure 6. Workarounds and blocks

The majority of blocks were determined to be a category 7 block meaning they
fall into section 7, technology, of the diagram. This indicates that most blocks standing in
the way of carrying out the work practices as intended were the result of technology.
Several blocks motivated by the existence of technology include issues with scanning. A
couple examples of these sorts of blocks include the barcode on a diluent bag being
scratched and therefore not scanning or the WFMS not recognizing a scanned ingredient.
Another block motivated by technology is the WFMS recording a different quantity of
ingredient remaining in a vial than is actually remaining, which is also a SV.
The majority of workarounds were categorized as belonging to category 4 of the
diagram meaning that they incorporated technology and work practices. Most category 4
workarounds were prompted by blocks categorized as category 7. In fact, the category 7
block and category 4 workaround was the most common block/workaround pair. For
example, when the product bag does not scan due to the barcode being scratched two
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category 4 workarounds were determined. The first is scanning another product bag and
then using either the scanned bag or the bag that did not scan. Alternatively, it was
observed that certain product bags failed to scan on such a consistent basis that a
“scanning bag” had been established – that is a bag of product was marked “for scanning
only” and was used to scan whenever that product was needed. In addition to the
previously mentioned category 7 block of a WFMS recording a different quantity of
ingredient remaining in a vial than is actually remaining, two category 4 workarounds
were determined. One, used when the WFMS thinks there is less ingredient remaining
than is actually there, is to scan an additional vial but only use the initial vial. When
dealing with a reconstituted dose, the pharmacy technician could reconstitute more of that
ingredient and do the same thing (i.e., scan the additional reconstituted vial but not use
it).
When the WFMS thinks there is more ingredient remaining than is actually there,
also a category 7 block, there are two response workarounds, both categorized as a
category 5 workaround. Category 5, which incorporates actual work practices but not the
technology or policy and procedures, is a common categorization for workarounds.
Workarounds classified as category 5 form the second largest group.. This makes sense
since workarounds reflect actual work practices that fall outside of standard work
practices. Several category 5 workarounds involve the user working outside of the
technology rather than incorporating the technology into the task. For example, bag and
vial system doses (e.g., diluent bags that connect to a powdered ingredient vial) being
made prior to receiving orders for these doses and other doses (primarily insulin) being
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made prior to interacting with the WFMS. Other related examples of category 5
workarounds include drawing the ingredient into the syringe prior to scanning the
ingredient vial and taking pictures of pulled back syringes (rather than syringes full of the
ingredient to be injected into the diluent bag).
Category 2 is another common category for workarounds. Category 2 involves
workarounds that incorporate both actual work practices as policy and procedure but do
not incorporate technology. As such, category 2 often involves bypassing the WFMS.
Bypassing the WFMS is a built in workaround for users to utilize when it is not possible
to incorporate the WFMS. Blocks that may motivate a user to formally bypass the WFMS
include a correct ingredient not scanning due to a new manufacturer’s barcode or the
ingredient not having been added to the WFMS yet. Unlike when users do not use the
WFMS as intended by creating the dose prior to interacting with the system, there is a
formal bypass procedure that follows policy and procedures. In situations where it is not
possible to scan an ingredient, the user may, within the WFMS, select an option to
bypass. This prompts the system to print labels for the dose and allow the user to create
the dose without interacting with the system (e.g., pictures of the dose preparation
process are not made). As such, the built-in workaround of bypassing incorporates both
the work practices and policy and procedures.
While it may initially appear that category 1 would not encompass any
workarounds since it incorporates the three things – technology, work practices, and
policy and procedures – there are a few workarounds that fall in this category. No
workarounds were classified as category 3, 6 or 7. One example of a category 1
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workaround is again in response to the WFMS not recognizing a scanned ingredient. If
the dose is not urgent, the user can submit the unrecognized ingredient to a list of
ingredients to be added and wait for the ingredient to be added which usually takes no
more than a couple hours. Once the ingredient is added, the dose can be prepared as
usual. Because this follows an established protocol it incorporates the policy and
procedures. It is a process that users actually complete and therefore incorporates work
practices. And finally, because it allows technology to be involved as intended, it
incorporates technology. However, because it is a deviation from a standard work
practice (e.g., the system works as intended and accepts the correct ingredient when
scanned), it is a workaround. Similarly, if the scanner used to scan doses into their
location on the floor loses connectivity and fails (a category 7 block), a user may neglect
to use the scanner entirely (a category 5 workaround) or may restart the scanner in order
to allow connectivity to be re-established. The latter is again a category 1 workaround
because it incorporates policy and procedure (this is the established protocol for users to
follow in situations when the scanner fails), incorporates actual work practices and leads
to the technology being used as intended.
Blocks, unlike the workarounds they motivate, fall into all 7 categories. Category
7 blocks, which we have already discussed, are by far the most common category.
Category 2 blocks, which include things such as an urgent dose being needed while in the
middle of working on another dose and a pharmacist being unsure from the artifacts
(physical or digital) given whether the dose was properly prepared, is the second most
common block category. Fewer blocks were categorized into category 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6.
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An example of a category 1 block is the perception that incorporating the WFMS into the
insulin preparation process increases the preparation time. One category 3 block is a
block intentionally built into the system – the WFMS does not allow two people to be in
(e.g., working on) the same dose at the same time. This, when the system is used as
intended, prevents duplicate doses from being created. Category 4 blocks, which are
motivated by both technology and actual work practices but not policy and procedures,
include not knowing which doses at the sorting station have been verified and not being
able to see the quantity of insulin in the syringe with the cap on. A category 5 block,
which is motivated solely by technology, is a picture missing from the digital dose
artifacts sent to the verifying pharmacist. Blocks motivated solely by policy and
procedures, which are category 6 blocks, include pharmacy technicians needing a label to
order a controlled substance ingredient from the pharmacist and it being unclear what
needs to be in each picture.
This concludes the description of the results found in three main areas – general
results, results specific to SVs and results specific to workarounds. The following chapter
will discuss these results, what they mean, and how they fit into the research of others.
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CHAPTER 4. DISCUSSION
The objective of this study is to investigate the impact that implementing a
WFMS has on a work system, work practices, and subsequent patient safety. This was
done by identifying SVs pre- and post-WFMS implementation and workarounds that
users engage in as a result of the implementation of the WFMS and the blocks that create
these workarounds. A key finding was that the risk, as indicated by the RPN, associated
with SVs existing in both the pre- and post-implementation work system, decreased with
the implementation of the WFMS. However, certain SVs were introduced as a result of
the WFMS, indicating that a technology may simultaneously reduce risk in one area but
introduce it in another area. This finding is supported by previous studies examining the
impact of technology in healthcare which have found that the technology eliminates
certain safety concerns while introducing unexpected new safety concerns (Ash et al.,
2004; Grossman et al., 2012; Karsh et al., 2010).
In regards to blocks and workarounds, it was found that the majority of blocks
were identified as category 7 blocks, meaning that they were the result of technology.
These blocks often resulted in workarounds which were identified as category 4
workarounds meaning that they incorporated work practices and technology. Category 4
was the most common category identified for workarounds. Following the
implementation of a technology, in this case a WFMS, it follows that the new technology
creates blocks for the users who are adapting to the new work system and new work
practices. A study examining nurse’s work practices and workarounds following the
implementation of a Bar Code Medication Administration (BCMA) Holden et al. (2013)
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found that in some cases the technology blocked previous preferential problem-solving
behaviors, resulting in the nurses needing to develop new work practices. Technology
could motivate a block for a variety of reasons including the technology not
accommodating actual work practices, the user having an inappropriate level of trust in
the technology, and the technology requiring a change in work practices from the pretechnology implementation work system. In the post-implementation work system, the
use of technology is necessary to complete the dose preparation process, so it makes
sense that most of the workarounds resulting from the technology blocks incorporate both
work practices (i.e., how the work is actual done) and technology, albeit perhaps
differently than intended.
Often actual work practices differ from the intended work practices. When
changing a work system, such as by implementing a new technology, it is important to
consider what actual work practices are and design the new work system to accommodate
these actual work practices (as opposed to intended work practices). If a new work
system is designed based on the intended work practices without consideration for the
actual work practices (and why these differ), then it is possible that it may invite SVs and
encourage workarounds since the system does not support the actual work practices.
Relatedly, in the post-implementation work system, workarounds may result in actual
work practices being different from intended work practices. This may happen if the
technology does not support the way users have grown accustomed to doing work. For
example, in the pre-implementation work system creating multiple doses of the same
medication at a time, particularly doses such as insulin that only require drawing one
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medication into a syringe, was common. However, if the WFMS has been set up to only
create one dose at a time, this results in a workaround when pharmacy technicians are
creating multiple insulin doses at a time and then interacting with the WFMS. The
perception is that interacting with the WFMS while creating doses such as insulin slows
down the dose preparation process. While almost all pharmacy technicians created insulin
doses in this way, very few pharmacy technicians were observed preparing other types of
doses prior to interacting with the system. The pharmacy technicians who did prepare
doses independently of the WFMS may have done so as a result of their level of trust in
the system.
The user’s perception of the technology with which they interact impacts how
they interact with the technology. One aspect of the user’s perception is their trust in the
system. A user who thinks the WFMS is capable of less than it actually is may disuse the
technology – that is, reject the technology and only rely and use it as little as possible.
We see the results of users disusing technology in the workarounds involving pharmacy
technicians creating doses prior to interacting with the WFMS. These workarounds
ranged from drawing the ingredients into the syringe prior to scanning the ingredients to
creating the entire dose prior (i.e., drawing the ingredients and injecting them into the
diluent) to interacting (e.g., scanning, taking pictures) with the WFMS. In these cases
disusing the technology is harmful as it eliminates some of the safety aspects of the
WFMS – ensuring the correct ingredients are used and a closer representation of the work
process is relayed to the pharmacist for verification than in the pre-implementation work
system when the pharmacist had to determine if a dose was properly prepared based
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solely on the physical artifacts utilized in the dose preparation process. Conversely,
misuse is trusting a technology beyond its capabilities. Misuse, like disuse, can have a
negative impact on how the user interacts with the system.
With the implementation of the WFMS several artifacts moved from physical to
digital, changing the way in which external knowledge, or knowledge in the world, is
presented. This made it more accessible for the user. It also moved certain knowledge,
such as the actual quantities of the ingredient to use, from being in the head to being in
the world. Pre-implementation the knowledge required to create the dose could primarily
be found in the world and combined with the user’s internal knowledge (i.e., knowledge
in the head). However, the knowledge in the world was not easily accessible – it was on
drug inserts (paper inserts from the manufacturer with details on how to properly prepare
a dose using that particular ingredient), labels and reference sheets created by the
pharmacist and pharmacy technicians. It was not centrally located and often the
information found required additional calculations or manipulations before it could be
used. The inconvenience of locating all of this information incentivized the user to
internalize some of the external knowledge. For example, a pharmacy technician may be
more acutely aware of which doses expired quickly or any particularity of using a certain
ingredient (e.g., requires a filter needle, can only be used with saline, etc.). This is
because reading the entire ingredient insert or looking at all supplementary guides for
each dose order is impractical and a nuisance. Once that information was presented
through electronic artifacts – the WFMS – it was much more easily accessible for the
user since it was all in one location. The WFMS told the pharmacy technician how to
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prepare the dose including any special preparations that were needed such as using a filter
needle. As a result of the ease of accessing this knowledge in the world, the user may no
longer feel the need to retain the same knowledge in their head (Norman, 2013). This
means that when the WFMS is bypassed there is an increased risk not only because the
safety features, such as scanning, are not used but also because the user may not have all
requisite knowledge in the head.
In conclusion, introducing a new technology into a work system can reduce
certain risks, as shown by the elimination of SVs and reduction of RPN for SVs that
continued to exist. However, the new technology also opens the work system up to new
risk, as shown by the introduction of new blocks and there subsequent workarounds and a
new SV. Nevertheless, in this case the positive impact the WFMS has on safety are
greater than the potential negative impact and the WFMS implementation is concluded to
have an overall positive impact. The positive impact of technology, such as the WFMS,
implementation can be increased by being mindful of the potential risks introduced by the
implementation of the technology.

Limitations
As an observational study there was the risk that the Hawthorne Effect impacted
subject’s behavior during observation. Efforts were made to minimize this (e.g., multiple
observations, being an impartial observer).
All observations were done after the WFMS had already been implemented and
therefore an understanding of the pre-implementation work system was developed
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through conversations with those who had worked in the pre-implementation work
system. Observing the pre-implementation work system may have allowed for a deeper
understanding of certain aspects and may have led to observing aspects that the users did
not mention in our discussions. Therefore, future research should consider observing the
pre-implementation work system.
All observations and coding were done by one person. Consequently there is the
risk of bias. Efforts were made to minimize any user bias by consulting with others on the
list of system vulnerabilities, workarounds and observations.

Impacts and Implications
The categorization structures used in this research can be utilized in future
engineering needs assessments which analyze potential technology’s integration into
work systems. Both the identification of SVs and workarounds and the manner in which
the SVs and workarounds were examined is unique.
While this research examined the implementation of a WFMS in a pharmaceutical
environment, the outcomes can be generalized to the implementation of other types of
technologies in other areas. Technology, already prevalent in several aspects of our lives,
is becoming more and more prevalent in new ways and in new areas. A few examples
include small business owners transforming phones and tablets into cash registers,
automobiles offering increased automation for driving tasks that were once manual or
only partially automated, or the incorporation of web-based learning into our educational
experience. All of these technologies offer benefits – the convenience of having point of
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service software without having to make the expensive upfront investment, making the
driving experience more comfortable, efficient, and safe for drivers, and increased
learning time without increasing the work load on instructors. However, there may be
unintended consequences or inconveniences to implementing these technologies – having
to sign a screen instead of a paper receipt may alienate some customers, the loss of the
ability to do the driving tasks manually, or connectivity issues causing students to miss
out on assignments and causing additional hassle for instructors. Consequently, it is
important that technology and its impact on the work system is understood. The
methodology used in this study can be applied to areas such as those previously given
and help develop the necessary understanding. The analysis methodology and framework
of this analysis can be applied to areas where technology continues to play an
increasingly important role.
As a qualitative study, this research also fills a gap in the medication error
research which has primarily focused on a quantitative analysis of specific outcomes
(e.g., error reduction) following the implementation of a specific technology (Bates et al.,
1998; Eslami et al., 2006; Moniz et al., 2014; Nebeker et al., 2005). Also, unlike previous
research, this research focuses on potential errors or situations which may give rise to
errors. The framework of this study allows the examination of a work system prior to an
error which can help prevent the error from occurring rather than relying on the
occurrence and detection of an error to assess the system.
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Future Research
This research developed a new methodology of categorizing SVs and
workarounds which provides a new way in which to analyze a work system. This
research applied this methodology to a pharmaceutical environment where a WFMS was
recently implemented. The methodology allows for a proactive identification of problem
areas which allows for analysis prior to a safety event occurring.
This methodology is applicable to other areas of healthcare, such as electronic
health records (EHR), as well as in other domains such as manufacturing. Further
research will utilize this methodology in other domains as well as with different
technologies in order to evaluate how it works in other domains. Additionally, future
research will, if possible, observe the work system prior to the implementation of the
technology as well as following implementation.
Through further research it will be possible to evaluate how SVs and workarounds
translate into engineering user needs assessments for iterative design cycles. By utilizing
the methodology used in this research in other domains, the role of SVs and workarounds
in a variety of domains will be better understood. This will allow for the SVs and
workarounds, and the benefits from identifying them prior to implementation, to be
utilized to better identify the needs of the user. This can result in a better implementation
process.
Further research should also evaluate how this methodology of identifying SVs
and workarounds can fit into the design cycle for future technologies. Similar to utilizing
SV and workaround identification to better understand the user needs, identifying how
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this methodology can be utilized in the design of future technologies is necessary. It
should be evaluated, in a variety of domains, how this methodology can assist with
developing a better design of technology.
Additionally, there is room for future research in how users adapt to technology.
Identifying workarounds is the beginning of identifying how users adapt to technology,
and there is the opportunity for additional research in this field such as identifying the
role complacency plays in the user-technology interaction.
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